Abstract. The environment is an important but overlooked piece in the construction of multiagent-based scenarios. Richness, believability and variety of scenarios are inseparable from the environment because every action and interaction of agents is based around the environment they are situated in. The prerequisite, however, is that agents must be able to understand the environment and capture its dynamic nature. This paper proposes a cognitive middle layer between agent minds and the environment. Aspects of the reality are mapped to concepts in the middle layer, through which agents can feel and reason about the real environment. The middle layer is modelled with a structured specification based on Web Ontology Language (OWL) to be extensible and reusable. Environmental concepts are integrated into the goal processing of agents to trigger intentions. This paper also reports our initial investigation about the design of a simulation system for multiple environment-aware agents and multiple users.
Introduction
Computational models of story scenarios are gaining importance lately [14] [11] [6] . With intelligent agent technologies, characters of the scenarios can be made autonomous and express human-like behaviors [9] . Therefore, instead of a static story shown in movies or novels, a flexible scenario construction can be obtained, where agents behave intelligently and respond to the behaviors of the user intelligently. Such scenarios are useful for many purposes, including digital entertainment [18] , simulation-based training [16] , and education [6] [7] . Although the multiagent paradigm helps developing agents that exhibit believable behavior through interaction, the importance of environment is often overlooked. To evaluate agent designs incorporated with complex cognitive or social characteristics, a rich dynamic environment is needed [8] . The environment is therefore an important part of a convincing scenario not only because agents can interact with the environment and other agents, but also because the environment provides foundations for richer agent interactions. In other words, agent interactions are not confined to exchange of messages; the agents interact through many alternative media provided by the environment. The changes an agent makes to the environment can either convey a message to or directly affect other agents. We propose the idea of believable environments, which agents can interact with. The believability of an environment depends on how well it can express agent behaviors in a human-like and realistic way. The challenge is that agents must be able to understand and reason about the environment in order to exploit it. Also, the agents must be able to sense the changes in the environment and affect it with actions. However, it is difficult for agents to understand the environment as a continuous entity or numerical values. Psychological studies show that human beings form discrete concepts (also known as schemata) from the environment and use them to think. Cantor and Kihlstorm [1] argue that the schemata in the human brain has a complex hierarchical structure, while Trafimow and Wyer [15] describes schemata as abstract concepts and some concrete instances of them. There are two major advantages of modelling agent cognition in a similar way. First of all, agents that think on concepts are understandable to human beings because humans can comprehend the feelings of and decisions made by the agents. Second, the connection among concepts enables agents to infer state transitions of the environment without going into complex numerical calculation.
However, contrary to human beings, we believe that agents' concept model of the world should be constructed as a part of the environment instead of inside the mind of agents. Here we propose a three-layer architecture. The bottom layer is the physical environment that works according to physical laws. The middle layer is the concept model, in which concepts are identified and connected. The concept model is merged into the environment and shared among all agents in the scenario because doing so avoids redundancy of concepts and gives all agents a common conceptual basis so that they can reason about the actions among one another. The topmost layer is the subjective mind, which resides in an agent. Physical environments map to concepts, which in turn trigger the sentiments and intents of agents. With this architecture, the agents have a high-level representation of the environment which is integrated in the scenario seamlessly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background and reviews related work. Section 3 introduces the three-layered cognitive architecture and explains how an agent maps the reality to concepts and concepts to its mind. Section 4 discusses the design of such a simulation system. Section 5 concludes this paper.
Background and Motivation
Research efforts that can be ascribed as construction of believable scenarios consist of diverse application domains including simulation-based training, storytelling and entertainment, as mentioned in section 1. Nevertheless, an explicit model of environment is missing in most of the research efforts related to believable scenarios. Riedl's Mimesis system [13] for scenario control in an interactive drama is built on top of the Unreal Tournament engine, a commercial 3D gaming environment. Although the environment of Mimesis provides a background for narrative stories, it is more like a drama stage for actor agents who have already decided what to do than a realistic environment that agents can dynamically interact with. The simulation system of Norling and Sonenberg [8] [9] is built on a similar gaming environment, Quake 2. Instead of creating agent-based dramas, Norling and Sonenberg focus on creating agents that mimic human game-playing behaviors. There is no explicit notion of environment modeling, and therefore believability of their agents is specific to the game environmment allowing only a small set of combat actions such as running and shooting.
The background environment has an important role in Mission Rehearsal Exercise project [16] , which simulates a traffic accident in a peacekeeping scenario. In this scenario, a human trainee plays a lieutenant and collaborates with intelligent virtual humans enacting the roles of his sergeant and other characters by negotiating plans and tasks. The environment is represented to human trainees with 3D graphical virtual environment and immersive audio. Despite the fact that the environmental factors such as weather and physical surroundings can actually change the situation that the trainee must face, there is no explicit description about how the environment is presented to agents, and it is hard to see how the virtual humans will adjust their behaviors when the environment is changed by a designer. In summary, we observed a tendency toward viewing a believable scenario as a set of virtual characters that exhibit believable behaviors through interacting among themselves or with a human participant; little emphasis is put on the interaction between characters and the environment. Thus, the agents either are able to act in a specific environmental context only, or ignore the environment entirely. We believe that the absence of a model of environment not only leaves a major source of believability unexploited, but also limits the applicability of existing approaches. Although work on environments for multi-agent simulation [5] [21] exists, their focus is on providing a framework for agent development and testing instead of constructing a dynamic and interactive environment.
A notable exception is Doyle [3] , who proposed the idea of annotated environment that facilitates building believable agents which guide the user through virtual worlds such as virtual galleries and computer games. The environment is described with annotations on objects, events and contextual information. The annotations inform agents of what operations can be invoked, what emotions should be triggered, and so on. As a result, an agent does not need to carry a lot of environmental information before visiting a different place because the information has already been annotated in the environment. Doyle's work enables agents to be situated in the environment, however, his approach still has two limitations. First, the annotations dictate the functions of objects in the environment and do not provide enough clues for agents to act intelligently and creatively. In Doyle's own example, a spray can of plant killer is annotated with a single purpose which is to kill the plant guardian. This annotation tells agents what can be done with the object, but also makes it impossible for agents to infer that the plant killer can also slay other plant monsters, tremove weeds, or simply be thrown at others. Second, static annotations have the risk of washing out behavoral differences among agents. Behavioral differences are expected when different agents enter the same place, or when the same agent stays at or revisits a place that has changed. For example, a room annotated as a romantic place will stop being romantic when too many agents enter it, and agents inside this room will change their moods and behaviors according to their tolerance to noise. The need to create behavioral differences will increase as the scenario becomes larger, longer or more dynamic in nature. We argue that such desirable behaviors can only be modeled with a systematic method to update agents' beliefs about the environment; mere static annotations are unstructure and hence do not suffice. Instead of instructing the agents what they can and what they should feel, we think the environment should provide hints to agents about its effects on them, allowing creative use of the environment and exhibition of different personalities.
Our cognitive architecture defines ontologies as the abstraction of the world, and maps aspects of the environment to concepts in the ontologies. In this aspect, our approach is comparable to Dickinson and Wooldridge's Nuin agent architecture [2] in which BDI agents [12] use the Semantic Web as their knowledge sources. However, our architecture differs from Nuin as our concept model has built-in reasoning capability about the direct causal relations between actions/events and environmental effects. The most significant advantage of our approach is that agents can be designed to know only a subset of concepts while the whole ontology is stored in the environment. Agents can query the concept model about what can be done with an object or what must be done to bring about an effect. The relation between BDI agents and our cognitive architecture is a topic for future investigation. Although this paper does not aim to provide a comprehensive model of multi-agent systems, it can be related to the formal notion of situated multi-agent systems, whose reference can be found in [17] [4]. Figure 1 illustrates the cognitive architecture with a simple example. The architecture consists of three layers. They are, in bottom-up order, reality, concept model and agent mind. We describe each of them in the following subsections.
Cognitive Architecture

Reality Model
This reality layer represents the objective physical environment whose existence does not depend on the agents' minds. To create a realistic scenario, the environment should be modelled in a way similar to how the real world works. Simplifications are necessary since producing a virtual world that functions exactly the same as the real world is notably difficult. Fortunately, in many cases believable scenarios do not require absolute resemblance to real environments; the virtual environments just need to be recognized as realistic. Thus, designers of the reality layer can develop their approximations of the environment to suit their target applications.
The reality layer contains two different models, each of which addresses an aspect of the environment. In the first perspective, the environment can be viewed as a set of physical properties, such as the temperature of a point in the location, the hardness of a sword, and the burning point of a wooden chair. Physical properties can change with time according to some physical laws. For example, heat diffuses from places with high temperature to those with low temperature. Physical laws also tell that when the temperature of an object is higher than its burning point, it burns and produces more heat. With simple physical laws, a large set of possible phenomena and consequences can be derived.
However, artificial objects are often complex, and their functions cannot be explained by simple physical laws. For example, the seemingly simple relation between keys and locks has delicate craft behind it. Thus, the second perspective that views environment objects as artifacts (man-made items) is necessary. An artifact directly maps to specific concepts in the concept model as its usage functions (to be described in the next subsection); the functions of an artifact do not need to be explained with physical properties. Nevertheless, an artifact is still a physical object and possesses physical properties. The key in the example above is an artifact because it opens doors, but it still is made of metal and has a melting point. The general principle is that the more delicate and complex an item is, the more likely it is modelled as an artifact.
Concept Model
The concept model is the middle layer that allows minds to understand the reality. It is external to any agents and should be supplied by the builders of the environment. Otherwise, each agent will have to store a complete conceptualization of the world. An external concept model not only reduces redundancy but can also be extended without modifying all agents. Besides, agents will act believably and consistently if they use identical external concept model provided by environment. The concept model is primarily a set of interconnected concepts, which can be realized as ontologies and rules.
Concepts and Reality Although every object has its physical properties that can be represented numerically, people do not always understand it by these numerical values. Take temperature as an example again. If the temperature is lower than a "normal standard" that the agent holds, it is ascribed as cold. Similarly, if the temperature is higher than a normal one, it is hot. If something has a very high temperature and starts emitting light, it is called a fire. Hot, cold and fire are concepts inferred from the environment. The reality must be transformed to a set of concepts before the agent can think about and use it. More concretely, an agent maps an aspect of the environment to an instance of concepts in the concept model. For physical objects, the correspondence between reality and concepts is obtained through a set of mapping functions. Artifacts, on the contrary, are directly assigned as instances of concepts during design time. Note that although the qualitative concepts of hot and cold are in most cases shared among human beings, each agent can have its own standard about the normal temperature. Thus, the mapping functions should sometimes take the personal traits of the agent as a parameter that affects the outcome. The system design described in section 4 reflects this.
It is also important to note that although artifacts always match a concept perfectly, the matching between a physical object and a concept is usually imperfect. In the case of artifacts, people have concepts first and then build the instances later. For example, people invented locks and keys because they only want to allow those who are authorized to access certain properties. Conversely, physical objects exist before any conceptual abstractions emerge, and therefore the categorization is usually ambiguous. Thus, the mapping functions return a similarity value that indicates the accuracy of classification. With the mapping function, the similarity value of an object to a concept can be computed. For example, a crossbow is an artifact, and therefore its similarity value to the concept "weapon" is always 1. A decoration sword, even if not designed as a weapon in its usage functions, can still be inferred as a weapon because its physical properties (sharpness, hardness and weight) can easily be exploited to harm people. A glass bottle, although not as effective as a sword, also possesses harmful properties (being hard and somewhat heavy). Whether the agents will consider a glass bottle a weapon is not so obvious because its similarity value to the weaponry concept is lower than that of a sword. In principle, agents will take into consideration the concepts that are better matched by an object. Thus, in a bar fight agents will look for instances that map to the concept of weapon with a high similarity value, such as a sword. They will consider utilizing things like a glass bottle only when a good match cannot be found.
Concept and Perception
The difference between traditional perception-based approaches and the concept-matching approach deserves elaboration. The examples mentioned above can be used to explain the difference between the two approaches. Although fire is very hot, an agent cannot sense fire by temperature. Instead, the agent tells that something is on fire by the shape and the color of light, from which the agent can decide the temperature of the fire (although inaccurately) with experience. Similarly, agents have no way to tell the weight and hardness of a glass bottle without grasping it. In summary, there are some aspects of the world that cannot be easily perceived; knowledge and expertise are needed to decide them. To reduce the complexity, the mapping functions between reality and concepts are designed to imply common-sense knowledge. Thus the concept model subsumes perception. Whether this approach can be an adequate basis for model human-like perception capabilities is an issue for future investigation.
Concept Structure Although concepts represent the environment in a way that is meaningful for the agents, they alone do not enable agents to reason about the environment. The important fact that concepts are interconnected is what makes reasoning possible. The connection among concepts is divided into two types: ontologies and causal rules. Ontologies define both the hierarchy of concepts ("fire is a subclass of light source") and the type of relationship between instances of concepts; the latter is defined through a linking word, also known as a property. A property can be either a purely descriptive property or a causal property; the latter is used to define causal relations. For example, suppose the concept Key has a causal property unlocks on the concept Lock, the ontology can be used to define the causal relation that key k unlocks lock l. Causal rules, on the contrary, describe the effect that all instances of a concept can cause on all instances of another. "Fire burns inflammable" is such a rule, for instance. Causal properties and causal rules are nevertheless defined through the same set of linking words. A linking word marks the type of the rule/relation and is associated with an action and the effect triggered by the action. An effect can be an addition or a removal of a state or a type of the target. For example, the linking word unlock mentioned above is associated with the action Unlock and the effect Unlocked. Suppose key k can be used to open lock l, the causal relation between them can be represented as a triple (k, l, unlock ), which has the following semantics:
Note that, although the set of possible relations is defined in the concept model through linking words, actual relations between instances are a part of the reality layer. As would be explained later, agents cannot perceive every actual relation.
The general form of all rules is defined as a triple (C, C, L), where C is set of all concepts and L is the set of all linking words. For any rule (Source, Target, Link ), Source, Target ∈ C, Link ∈ L, the semantics of the rule is defined as follows:
For example, the linking term burn in figure 1 is associated with the action Touch and the effect Fire. Thus the rule "fires burn combustibles" is defined as:
Similarly, the rule "igniters burn inflammables" is defined as:
The rule "light source eliminates darkness" is defined as:
Note that in (5) the agent does not need to do anything to lighten the darkness, and therefore the action is Noop. Actions are also hierarchical; the action Hit implies Touch and therefore can be defined as a subclass of Touch. Combining ontologies and rules results in a wide range of causal reasoning. For example, the agent can infer that an instance of fire (which is a subclass of light source) can eliminate darkness.
As concepts are abstractions of physical properties and artifacts, rules are abstractions of physical laws. Ideally, rule defines the causal effect between every instance of two concepts, and therefore every instance of fire can burn every instance of combustible. However, this is not always true since the instances may not be a perfect match for the concept. Tissue papers and hard wood both can be instances of combustible, but the former has a higher similarity value than the latter and is more likely to catch fire. Thus, when reasoning about rules an agent must take the similarity value into consideration. Agent will apply rules that have a higher chance to succeed since they consider better matches of concepts first. Note that, even if an agent applies a small fire on an combustible and it does not burn, that agent still succeeds in behaving believably, because human themselves can also lead to failures of the same kind.
Selective Information Exposure Though the concept model provides cues for agents to interact with artifacts and other existences in the reality layer, not all concepts should be acknowledged by every agent. We briefly explain and classify these conditions into two conditions as below.
Different Cultures
The social norms in different societies may not be the same, and hence the usage of artifacts produced in one civilization may not be recognized properly by the outsiders. In this case, the agents can only speculate the artifact usage from its physical features, and can only result in primitive usage such as eat or throw. However, an outsider may gain the knowledge of artifacts from certain methods, such as personally observing others using them. To define the relation between civilization and its artifacts, we take a bottom-up approach. Designers must design artifacts with their usages, and then assign these artifacts to one existing civilization in the current scenario. In other words, a civilization is established by containing various artifacts and other social concepts, or it would simply be an empty set. No artifact is created without associated civilization.
Causal Relations The agent does not see specific causal relations between an artifact and another one, even the agent and artifacts come from the same society. For example, an agent without previous knowledge cannot ensure whether key k can open lock l by mere looking at them, though he identifies this artifact correctly as a key. Such knowledge has to be gained through instruction manuals, other agents, or simply trial and error. The knowledge is then stored in the memory of the agents as their beliefs, and the agent will stop trying different keys when he encounters this lock again.
Mind Model
The agent mind represents intelligent agent components, and the architecture consisting of them. Once the agents are in position, they would be able to interact with the believable environment, and therefore strengthen their own believability. Here we explain how concept model informs agents with traditional agent architecture design, and reserves the space for emotion cognition.
Instances of concepts are cues that trigger the activities of the minds of agents. Compare to the concepts, which (relatively) objectively represent the reality, mental activities are subjective because each agent can have different interpretations about the concepts. Mental activities include two major types: sentiments and intents. A concept can map to multiple sentiments, while multiple sentiments can also map to one concept. For example, Figure 1 shows that the presence of both darkness and silence in general trigger the emotion of fear. The mapping between concepts and sentiments can be put inside the concept model because certain commonness among human beings can be assumed. However, darkness and silence instill different degrees of fear into different agents, and the weights of darkness and silence vary from agents to agents. Thus, the personalities of agents must be taken into consideration when calculating the triggering of sentiments. Moreover, some agents may fear a particular thing that others do not necessarily fear, such as a rat, a gecko, or something more personal. Such personal emotional triggers can be placed inside an agent to override the default mapping in the concept model.
The triggering of intents involves two additional components of agent mind: goals and knowledge. Agents first have goals, and then look for knowledge that can be exploited to attain the goals. Knowledge is basically the connections between concepts [10] ; isolated concepts cannot help generating the intents since agents rely on the causal effects of the environment to reach the goals. For the purpose of this paper, a goal is defined as a desired effect on a particular target instance. Omitting the target instance means the goal is to apply the desired effect on an arbitrary individual. The following algorithm shows how causal rules in the concept model can be used in the process of triggering new intents. Causal relations that are remembered in the memory of the agent can also be used in a way similar to this algorithm. Take the intent illustrated in figure 1 for example. To overcome fear, the agent generates a subgoal of dispelling darkness with internal planning. Suppose d is an instance of darkness, the subgoal can be specified as Destroyed (d ). Then the intent of agent is triggered through triggerIntent algorithm. The process is described as follows:
First Call of triggerIntent(Destroyed(d)):
1. The agent looks for causal rules in the concept model. Any rules or relations whose effects satisfy the goal are retrieved. In this case, rule (5) defined in subsection 3.2 is discovered. 2. The agent checks whether anything in the environment is an instance of the source concept of the rule. In this case, the agent cannot find one because there is no light source in the environment. 3. If no instance of the source concept is found, the agent adds a new goal to create such an instance. In this case, the new goal can be specified as LightSource(null). 4. The original goal is suspended since the new goal must be accomplished before the original goal.
First Call of triggerIntent(LightSource(null)):
1. The agent executes triggerIntent with the new goal LightSource(null ). It looks for a rule whose effect creates an instance of either light source or a subclass of light source such as a fire. In this case, rules (3) and (4) are discovered. 2. Since the agent cannot find a fire to start another fire, rule (3) is filtered.
Thus the agent starts searching for an instance of Combustible which is the target concept of (4). A torch o is found. 3. The agent also looks for an instance of igniter, which is the source instance of (4). A matchbox m is found. 4. The agent retrieves the triggering actions of the rule/relation. If multiple possible actions exist, the agent can choose one of them due to other considerations such as the cost of the action, the side effects, etc. In this case the action is use. 5. The agent successfully generates an intent to use the matchbox on the torch.
Second Call of triggerIntent(Destroyed(d)):
1. The agent revisits the goal Destroyed (d ) again after the goal LightSource(null ) is accomplished. It manages to find a light source this time (the burning torch o). 2. In this special case, the only action is to trigger rule (5) is Noop. The agent then tries to carry out the intent and find that it does not need to do anything since the action is Noop. Thus the agent considers the goal attained internally. The agent can ensure the accomplishment of the goal by observing whether the instance of darkness really disappears.
This section discusses issues about the design and implementation of multiagent systems realizing the three-layer cognitive architecture described in above sections. Our goal is to provide a concrete implementation of the concept middle layer, enabling the agents to reason about the environment. We do not want to develop a general model of the reality (i.e. the environment itself) because each scenario can have a different model of the environment. Instead, an adapter interface is provided to allow the concept layer to be "plugged" onto different environments. Hence, agents can perform concept-based reasoning by interacting with the concept layer plugged onto different environments, including existing ones, without knowing the implementation details of each environment. 
Pluggable Architecture
Currently a primitive simulation system of the above scenario of dispelling darkness is created to show how a scenario can be constructed with the pluggable middle layer of environment concepts. Figure 2 illustrates the system architecture. Agents in the system are built upon the JADE agent platform [19] . There are four types of agents in the system: non-player-character (NPC) agents, user interface (UI) agents, concept mapper agents and reality adapter agents. The NPC agents are believable characters which realize the mind layer of the cognitive architecture. Human participants can interact with both the NPC agents and the concept mapper agent through UI agents. NPC agents and UI agents are on equal stance in that they can perceive the same data and act in the same way except that NPC agents are driven by artificial minds while UI agents are controlled by human. The reality adapter agent is responsible for monitoring the changes in the reality model and translates them into a form recognizable by the concept mapper agent. For this scenario we created our own the reality model that simulates temperatures, burning points and brightness of objects with simple formulae, but specific reality adaptor agents can be built to connect with existing environments such as computer games if the environment provide an application interface for retrieving environment states. The concept mapper agent manages the interaction between NPC/UI agents with the reality layer and thus has a central role in the system. Unlike the other three types of agents, which are specifically tailored for different scenarios or environments, the concept mapper agent has a fixed implementation and can be introduced to systems without modification.
Concept Mapper Agent
The concept mapper agent is in charge of both perception and action; it maps aspects of reality to instances of concepts and maps action instances to events. The scenario of dispelling darkness is used again as an example of how the concept mapper agent works with other agents. When an NPC agent intends to light a torch, it sends the concept mapper agent an action request to use a pack of flint and steel on the torch. The concept mapper agent translates the action to an event the reality adapter agent recognizes. For example, the action "touch" is interpreted as an event that the source object becomes adjacent to the target object for a short time. The reality adapter agent receives the event, according to which the agent applies actual changes to the environment. The environment changes according to the reality model, which determines that the temperature of the torch becomes higher than its burning point, and the reality adapter agent monitors changes in temperature and brightness. The reality adapter agent then reports these changes to the concept mapper agent, which maps the changes to instances of concepts. Suppose each NPC agent has the same standard about light. Then the concept mapper agent maps the increase in brightness to a new instance of the concept "light" and report the instance to all NPC agents. Each NPC agent, however, has a different standard about being hot, and thus the concept mapper agent must first retrieve the traits of the NPC agents and then use them as input arguments of the mapping function of the concept "hot". The concept mapper agent calculates the mapping function for each NPC agent and reports an instance of "hot" to the NPC agent if and only if the mapping function returns a positive result. The instances are stored in the knowledge base of NPC agents and may invoke a new intent or sentiment. Realizing Concept Structures The ontologies in the concept model are written in OWL [23] , which is expressive enough for the concept hierarchies and causal properties. The Jena Semantic Web tool [20] is used to parse the OWL ontologies. Jena contacts the RACER description logic reasoner [22] to perform ontological inference. Figure 3 depicts a sample ontology for describing the relationship between keys and locks. Causal rules and linking words are explicitly defined in separate tables. Rule-based inference is achieved with a simple program since the rules currently are in a simple fixed format. There is also an action ontology, also written in OWL, that defines the hierarchy of actions. For example, to hit is a sub-action of to touch because hitting A with B implies that A touches B. NPC agents obtain the concept structure through the concept mapper agent and use inference to trigger intents and sentiments, and to decide what actions to invoke.
Utilizing a Semantic Web language such as OWL is a key to the extensibility of our concept model. Reuse of ontologies can be easily attained by importing existing OWL documents. The reuse can facilitate the creation of new worlds and the integration of multiple existing worlds. In principle, the same NPC agent can travel to and from different worlds created by different authors because the knowledge needed for action and emotion is encoded in the environments. In this aspect, we share the view of Doyle's "knowledge-in-the-world" approach [3] , which decouples agents and environments so that they both can be developed independently.
Discussion on Scalability
This subsection discusses the scalability issues that can result from our system design of the three-layered architecture. The design decision of separating the concept model from agents has the advantage that agents do not need to carry environmental concepts with them. The separation removes redundancy and gives the agents a common basis of environmental understanding even when the size of the concept model grows.
An obvious issue is that the performance may downgrade significantly when the number of concepts and environmental aspects becomes high. For example, suppose there are 1000 concepts in the concept model and 100 aspects of environment in a room. At the first sight, the system will have to perform 200000 operations when two NPC agents enter the room if every aspect of environment is matched against every concept for every agent. The number of operations can cause the system to be overloaded.
However, we argue that not all operations are needed to be done at the same time. Only the few basic concepts related to the crucial background information, such as visual appearance, sound, or other defined concepts in the global settings are to be mapped and sent to the agents in the first place. Other more advanced concepts can be resolved in an incremental way as the time goes by. What kinds of concepts needs to be resolved afterward, are determined by the cognition strategy of agent mind, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Moreover, the problem can be further alleviated with offline computation. For a concept whose mapping functions does not take traits of NPC agents as parameters, an inverted list can be computed that contains all objects that are instances of the concept. The objects in the list are sorted in descending order according to the similarity values. For example, the concept mapper agent returns the elements in the inverted list of fire if requested with instances of fire. For concepts whose mapping functions take the traits of NPC agents as inputs, offline computation is still possible if the set of all possible values of the trait is a finite enumeration.
Conclusion
Environment modeling is an essential part of building a believable multiagent scenario not only because a realistic environment itself contributes to believability, but also because the characters are more believable if they interact with the environment in a convincing way. A three-layer cognitive architecture is proposed as a unified model of agents and environments. The bottom of the architecture is the reality layer that models the dynamic environment as either continuous values or discrete items. The top layer is the agent mind that generates emotions and makes plans. This paper focuses on the middle layer of concepts that bridges the mind and the reality. The concepts, which represent the aspects of the reality, are formulated as ontologies and rules through which agents can reason about the environment. The concept layer also includes a set of mapping functions that maps the reality to instances of concepts. A prototype system is built to allow agent-based characters to create intentions from instances sensed through the concept layer. The specification of the concept layer is based on OWL, and therefore has the advantage of being extensible and reusable. Developing large-scale virtual environments is possible since different environments designed by different authors can be connected by combining the concept models. We are planning to increase the scale of scenario of the prototype system and developing criteria for evaluation and performance analysis. We are also planning to further formulate the causal rules and integrate them within a formal BDI agent architecture. Another topic for future investigation is to incorporate the believable agents themselves as a part of the environment and use the same model for cognition about agents.
